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PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS
researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach
and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
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*Based on a study conducted by Llanto et al. for the Department of
Finance, March 2000.
**The author is Vice-President of the Philippine Institute for Devel-
opment Studies.
1With apologies to the Bard.
2The usual example cited to demonstrate government’s resolve to let
the private sector bear the brunt of infrastructure provision is the amended
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law passed during the Ramos administra-
tion.
To guarantee or not to guarantee
   . . . is not the question.1
PIDS Policy Notes No. 97-11 brought to the public’s
attention the problem of contingent liabilities arising from
the guarantees provided by the government to infrastruc-
ture projects. It called on government to establish a policy
framework for the provision of guarantees and, more im-
portantly, a system for managing contingent liabilities.
This Policy Notes now draws an outline of a risk
management approach that deals with expected and un-
expected losses from contingent liabilities. The basic re-
quirements are: (a) a risk-sharing arrangement with the
private sector, and (b) market-based pricing of the guar-
antee fee based on relative risks and market conditions.
Demand for government guarantee: the rationale
In the past, the Philippine government was heavily
involved in direct financing and provision of public utility
services either through government-owned and -controlled
corporations or through the direct control of utilities. Thus,
power, water and telecommunications, and civil works
such as roads, bridges and ports, used to be provided by
government under heavily regulated environments. Over
time, the deadweight losses created by market distor-
tions such as price controls and subsidies, and the fis-
cal costs of inefficient public sector delivery of infrastruc-
ture services have forced the government to privatize the
provision of infrastructure services. The cost of heavy
government presence had taken its toll against the boom-
bust Philippine economy. Thus, in recent years, the gov-
ernment has spared no effort in trying to attract private
sector participation in the infrastructure sector.2
The hard reality, however, is that it is very difficult to




sector when markets are highly regulated, uncertain and
distorted by price controls and subsidies. The private sec-
tor is all about making profitable investments, generating
surpluses and accumulating wealth. In its profit calculus,
it leaves no stone unturned in trying to recover costs and
generate profits from the business enterprise. When of-
fered the opportunity to participate in infrastructure invest-
ments where the scenario's realities, however, involved
entering highly regulated and distorted markets for infra-
structure and where political patronage could present real
constraints to efficient operation and great profitability, the
private sector therefore sought government guarantees to
cover a wide variety of perceived risks.
The Philippine government has thereupon provided
guarantees to encourage private sector participation in
infrastructure projects. Government guarantees seek to
minimize, and in some cases, eliminate certain risks that
discourage private sector participation in financing, build-
ing, maintaining and operating public infrastructure
projects. A government guarantee was an important fea-
ture of the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme that
helped solve the power crisis in the early 1990s. With
the help of a government guarantee, private investors
can maximize their return-to-risk ratio in the face of pres-
sure from financiers, investors, shareholders, and oth-
ers who want to minimize in turn their own risk exposure
to the private investors’ decision to take on risky infra-
structure projects. These guarantees to private investors
cover a wide variety of project-specific and general risks.3
Risks in infrastructure projects4
The risks most often shouldered by the national
government in BOT-type projects are characterized by:
] Site availability – the government guarantees
right-of-way (ROW) for the project. This involves the pur-
chase of the site for the project as well as the relocation
of project-affected personnel;
] Market risk – if the buyer of the service is a gov-
ernment entity, the government typically agrees to mini-
mum off-take contract purchases and prices (take or pay
arrangements). These have the effect of guaranteeing a
market for the output of the proponent such as power,
water, and others;
] Payment risk – if the buyer of the service is a
government entity, the government guarantees contrac-
tual performance;
] Change in law risk – the government reassures
proponents that changes in the legal framework will not
affect contractual agreements; and
] Foreign exchange risk – the government/central
bank agrees to provide forward cover for the proponent
which entails either making foreign exchange available for
the project or purchasing foreign exchange through a for-
ward contract for delivery at a later date.
Table 1 shows some of these project-specific risks
and their bearers.
Guarantees that cover market risks, foreign ex-
change risks and buyouts in the event of project termina-
tion contribute the greatest share to increases in the
contingent liabilities of government. The amount of un-
certainty inherent in the transition period, that is, from a
state of direct government provision to a state of
privatization, and the long gestation period of infrastruc-
ture projects imply that when such guarantees are pro-
vided, the government shoulders a larger proportion of
the risk of insufficient market demand, adverse exchange
rate fluctuations, and other negative shocks.
Costs of bearing risks
In bearing the risks on behalf of the private inves-
tors, meanwhile, what are the costs on the part of the
government?
In a guarantee agreement, the government prom-
ises to absorb certain risks faced by the private inves-
tors in uncertain infrastructure service markets. Depend-
ing on the state of markets prior to privatization, these
risks are the result of uncertainties usually associated with
__________
3Llanto and Soriano (1997).
4This section benefited from inputs provided by Prof. Renato E.




Project performance risks Power – power purchase agreements provide for the minimum power plant performance criteria which
High cost of service the proponent has to satisfy.
Bad/inefficient service Water – the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage System (MWSS) concession agreement states the
minimum criteria for project performance to be satisfied by the proponent.
Transport – most toll road concession agreements state the minimum criteria for project performance
to be satisfied by the proponent.
Project completion risks Power – the National Power Corporation (NPC) normally guarantees right-of-way and site availability
Delays for power projects.
Cost overruns Water – the MWSS concession agreement stipulates that cost overruns in projects may be passed
Site availability onto consumers provided they are covered in grounds for extraordinary price adjustments (EPA).
Otherwise, such costs are borne by the concessionaires.
Transport – responsibility for constructing access and feeder roads necessary for ensuring the
viability of many toll roads are assumed by the government.
Fuel and other inputs risk Power – in many instances, power purchase agreements include commitments by the NPC (also the off-
Fuel availability taker) to guarantee the supply of fuel inputs for independent power producers.
Skilled labor Water – the MWSS concession agreement transfers input risk to the concessionaire unless there are
grounds for extraordinary price adjustments.
Transport – inputs for road and bridge construction are usually carried by the contractor.
Market risk Power – at the height of the power crisis, the government agreed to bear significant market risks by
User demand for services adopting minimum off-take contracts with independent power producers.
Water – the MWSS concession agreement transfers market risk to the concessionaire. However, a
number of bulk water service contracts with pending approvals have minimum off-take provisions
with government-owned off-takers.
Transport – the MRT-3 contract includes a stipulation of minimum ridership, levels below which the
government must compensate the contractor.
Payment risk Power – all power purchase agreements stipulate that NPC’s commitments carry a full government
Creditworthiness of buyers guarantee for minimum off-take amounts. Thus, the relevant credit risk is that of NPC and the
of output government. All power purchase agreements (PPAs) carry a buyout clause which the independent
power producers (IPP) may invoke in case NPC commits a breach of contract or fails to make required
payments to IPPs.
Water – many proposed service contracts between bulk water providers and off-takers, usually
municipal water districts, carry guarantees of payment from the latter. Thus, the relevant credit risk
is of the municipal water districts or the municipal government.
Transport – there is no off-taker in most transport projects.
Financial risk Power – all PPAs carry a buyout clause which the IPP may invoke in case there is a change in circumstance
Debt service coverage that materially reduces or prejudices the IPP return and the Parties are unable to agree to a change in
Security the contract after a defined period (guaranteed rate of return risk). In addition, most capacity payments
Ongoing compliance are tailored to cover the project sponsor’s debt services plus a fair rate of return.
Water – in the MWSS Concession Agreement, the government does not assume financial risk. This is
instead passed on to the concessionaires.
Transport – debt service coverage is a risk assumed by private operators in the case of toll roads.
Country environment risk Power – all PPAs carry a buyout clause which the IPP may invoke in case there is a change in law or
Expropriation regulations, and if compliance with such laws results in:
Regulatory interference a) the power station being unable to operate;
Concession revoked b) the interest of the operator in the project and the operator’s expectation of its return on
Legal framework    investment being materially and adversely affected; and
Environmental approval c) the parties are unable to agree to an amendment of the PPA after the defined period of negotiation
Foreign exchange     (legal framework risk).
All PPAs carry a buyout clause which the IPP may invoke in case there is a force majeure event that
is within the reasonable control of the government or NPC which lasts for a defined period and the
Table 1. Selected project-specific risks and bearer of the risk




market demand, legal structure, political regime and for-
eign exchange during the transition period from public to
private sector provision. Bearing these risks at the outset
does not seem acceptable to the private sector. Thus, to
attract private investments, most, if not all, of these risks
will be passed onto the national government. Leaving such
risks to the government invariably creates contingent claims
on the government which can be triggered by certain
events.5
Policymakers, multilateral institutions and academ-
ics have expressed concern about the impact of contin-
gent liabilities on the fiscal position of governments. Fail-
ure by the government to charge risk-adjusted prices for
guarantees implies inadequate compensation for the risks
shouldered by the public sector. Comprehensive guaran-
tees expose taxpayers to potentially huge fiscal burdens
that are not necessarily justified especially if the risks cov-
ered by the guarantee are commercial in nature. In addi-
tion, the contingent nature of these liabilities is such that
governments which rely on cash budgeting do not provide
for them in their budgets. They become actual obligations
of the government when the private investor calls on the
guarantee. But since there is no or inadequate provision
for future calls in the budget, the guarantee call creates
undue problems on the government’s fiscal position. To
satisfy an unforeseen guarantee call, certain budgetary
items, e.g., expenditure for health, nutrition, and others,
may suffer. Table 2 shows the largest sources of contin-
gent liabilities in terms of size of exposure in various sec-
tors.
For sure, there are trade-offs in resource allocation
which involve the way public resources are spent. How-
ever, it is the accumulation of large contingent liabilities
and a lack of awareness of these that the national gov-
ernment should avoid in the future. And should it really
be necessary to encourage investment in a key area
through a guarantee, the potential government exposure
to contingent liabilities must be properly accounted for,
covered by adequate reserves and properly priced to re-
flect the scarcity value of government guarantees.
__________
5In 1997, Llanto and Soriano pointed out that government guaran-
tees have generated huge contingent liabilities which the government
should manage very well, otherwise, the government will be exposed to
substantial payment burdens once a guarantee call is triggered.
parties are unable to agree to a contract revision. In a few cases, this applies to all force majeure
events (force majeure risk). Many PPAs carry a buyout clause which the IPP may invoke in case the
NPC is privatized wherein it effectively results in a real or purported assignment of rights or
assumption of obligations under this agreement or wherein it materially and adversely changes its
net assets, projected profits, projected net cash flow from operations, prompting a reasonable
person to conclude that the ability of NPC or its successor entity to duly perform its obligations
under the PPA on a timely basis has been materially and adversely affected.
Water – in setting the concession fee equivalent to the annual debt amortization payments of
MWSS, the MWSS concession agreement effectively transfers the responsibility for paying MWSS
loans to the concessionaires. Since these loans have been contracted in foreign currency, the
concessionaires bear the risk. However, the concessionaires have cited the devaluation of the peso
in their latest petition for EPA before the MWSS Appeals Board. There are no automatic adjustment
mechanisms for passing these risks to consumers.
Transport – in toll road agreements, most of the country environment risks are assumed by the
government.
Note: The Philippines no longer guarantees foreign exchange rates at the time of conversion. What is
more prevalent is a guarantee of convertibility of domestic currency into foreign exchange.
Sources: International Finance Corporation (1996) and Llanto et al. (2000)





Framework for managing guarantees
and contingent liabilities
The comprehensive guarantees provided by the gov-
ernment to the power sector in the early 1990s created
a huge risk exposure for the public sector in terms of
contingent liabilities that become due once trigger events
lead to guarantee calls. Of course, it should be stressed
that said guarantees were deemed necessary at that time
to be able to bring in private investments to solve the
crippling power crisis during the closing months of the
Aquino administration. However, there is now a realiza-
tion that future government guarantees should be pro-
vided for more efficiently.
In view of this, there is a need to formulate a frame-
work that would help manage guarantees and contingent
liabilities.
Basic requirement: appropriate policy Basic requirement: appropriate policy
environment environment
A prerequisite for a good framework is the presence
of an appropriate policy environment. Certainly, macroeco-
nomic stability characterized by low inflation and low inter-
est rates will enable projects to have more certain cash
streams and a positive rate of return on investments. An
appropriate and transparent regulatory and legal frame-
work that safeguards public welfare and safety, upholds
contractual obligations and ensures adequate returns to
the investor will likewise support the enabling macroeco-
nomic environment fostered by government. Among the
critical areas that will require impartial and transparent rules
and procedures are the following: arbitration procedures,
enforcement of contractual obligations, competitive bidding
for supplies and equipment, tariff adjustment, and repa-
triation of capital.
The encouragement of solicited over unsolicited bids
for the implementation of infrastructure projects is crucial
in signaling that the government wants competitive forces
to come into play in the market. This will help  government
to ward off potential political pressure and lobbying behind
unsolicited bids.
A consistent macro-micro environment will thus help
minimize the risks of guarantee calls. Moreover, a growth
economy will shield the government from the risk of buyout
clauses or similar undertakings that are normally demanded
by private investors in uncertain and weak markets. The
end result is an overall reduction in risks, making fewer
guarantee calls more likely.
Things to consider Things to consider
What are the factors that need to be considered?
First, the government should recognize that a guarantee
cover is not a free resource which it can grant at will. With-
out making an efficient allocation of this resource and in
the face of budget constraints, the government can find
itself saddled with a fiscal shock once private investors
call on the guarantee. A contingent liability becomes an
actual claim on government’s fiscal resources once cer-
tain events trigger a call. Thus, as a scarce resource, a
guarantee should be efficiently allocated and its correct
pricing ensures, to a large extent, its efficient allocation.
Pricing of the guarantee should therefore consider market
conditions and relative project risks.
Table 2. Largest sources of contingent liabilities
in selected sectors
Power sectora
Buyout clause or termination Buyout or termination price
Buyout Buyout or termination price
Force majeure Buyout or termination price
Transport sector
Buyout Buyout or termination price
Force majeure Buyout or termination price
Water sector
MWSS to assume loans Cost of principal and
being paid by concessionaire interest on old MWSS loans
MWSS to pay early Early termination amount
termination fee
Loser of appeal to pay total Cost of appeals process
cost of appeal process
for both parties
Force majeure Early termination amount
aNote that the annual capacity payments by NPC to IPPs are
guaranteed, however, they do not give rise to contingent liabilities since





Second, the government should determine the
amount of guarantee cover that it can prudently provide in
any given year subject to a hard budget constraint. This
amount should cover not only guarantees to infrastructure
projects but also other guarantee programs implemented
by various government agencies, especially those that have
the nature of sovereign guarantees. In some instances,
the government only gives an indirect guarantee since the
first recourse of the private investor is the balance sheet
of the sponsoring agency. However, since this also exposes
the government to contingent liabilities, indirect guaran-
tees should thus be likewise considered in the totality of
the guarantee cover which the government can provide at
any given time.
Operationally and for practical reasons, it may be hard
to arrive at a "global amount of guarantee" that the gov-
ernment may provide at a given year as suggested by this
Notes. The second-best approach might be to ensure that
all national government agencies involved in the grant of
guarantees should be conscious of this principle when-
ever they consider the grant of guarantees and report to
the Department of Finance the amounts of guarantee that
they have provided, including the sector covered.
On this note, it is worthy to mention that the govern-
ment implements various guarantee programs through
several agencies such as the Quedan and Rural Credit
Corporation (QRCC), Small Business Guarantee and Fi-
nance Corporation (SBGFC), Guarantee Fund for Small
and Medium Enterprises (to be merged with SBGFC),
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF), Trade and
Industry Development Corporation (TIDCORP), Industrial
and Guarantee Loan Fund (IGLF) under the Development
Bank of the Philippines, and the Home Guaranty Corpora-
tion. The guarantees they provide are nontrivial; yet, there
is no one agency in the governmental bureaucracy that
has information on the global amount of guarantees pro-
vided, much less an appreciation of the associated contin-
gent liabilities. In this respect, therefore, there is a critical
need for a very serious study of the pricing, allocation and
management of guarantee schemes.
Third, the government should rank infrastructure and
other projects to be given guarantee cover in accordance
with their net social and private benefits. This will require
a thorough inter-agency discussion and if possible, calcu-
lation of the relative social and private benefits as well as
corresponding costs of projects. The  Medium-Term Philip-
pine Development Plan and the annual budgetary delibera-
tions can provide initial guidance on the relative ranking of
projects.
Fourth, the government should disaggregate and
assign risks to the party most capable of managing them
or whose actions have a direct bearing on their outcome.
Thus, a risk-sharing arrangement with private parties shall
reduce the demand for government guarantee and mini-
mize its exposure to contingent liabilities as well as re-
duce the moral hazard problems in implementing
projects.6 The sharing of risks has to be reflected in the
contracts to be executed between the contracting par-
ties.
Fifth, the government should consider giving only a
set of core guarantees to BOT projects as well as to con-
cession arrangements,7 covering only (a) fundamental
risks, e.g., uninsurable political risks; (b) fundamental
rights; and (c) foreign exchange convertibility. Fundamen-
tal rights bind the BOT proponent to undertake the project
in full accord with the terms of the contract. As such, the
government will grant the BOT proponent the exclusive
right to the project and will guarantee it against direct or
indirect government takeover unless there is a separate
agreement or buyout provision in the project agreement.
Foreign exchange convertibility guarantees the BOT
proponent’s right to (a) purchase foreign exchange in the
open market; (b) transfer its foreign currency funds abroad;
and (c) maintain foreign currency bank accounts in the Phil-
ippines or abroad. To be neutral, the core guarantees should
be applicable across sectors and impartial to all types of
projects.8
__________
6Llanto and Soriano (1997).
7ICC Policy Workshop on BOT and Related Policies, Tektite Build-





Sixth, the government should adopt an explicit exit
strategy for government guarantee in its contracts with
private investors, thereby minimizing the government’s risk
exposure and potential burden on its fiscal position. The
exit strategy will prevent perverse incentives and moral
hazard in project management and implementation. For
example, the government can include a provision for a fall-
away of government guarantee for foreign exchange con-
vertibility once the country attains an investment grade
rating in international capital markets.9
This is similar to the position taken by the NEDA-
Investment Coordination Committee to adopt a selective
and reasonable set of performance undertakings that are
subject to a fall-away clause. More specifically, commer-
cial and market risks that appropriately belong to the pri-
vate sector should no longer be covered by government
guarantees. Fall-away clauses were included in the 1200
MW Ilijan Natural Gas Power Plant wherein the performance
undertaking for the availability fees shall fall away when
the Philippines achieves an investment grade rating for its
Philippine peso debt for two consecutive years from Stan-
dard and Poor or Moody’s or other internationally recog-
nized rating agency of comparable standing.
Seventh, the government should include the dura-
tion of the guarantee cover or the period of cooperation
between the sponsoring agency/national government and
the project proponent in pricing the guarantees. A recent
analysis for the power sector shows that the greater the
time period within which the guarantee call can be exer-
cised, the more likely it will be exercised by the project
proponent. Thus, a higher guarantee fee or premium could
be required.10
Eighth, the government, together with the sponsor-
ing agency and the private investor, should review the guar-
antee fee annually in the light of changing business and
economic conditions, to give the Department of Finance
the opportunity to charge market-based guarantee fees.
The pricing of the guarantee fee is an important con-
sideration. In the absence of a first-best actuarial basis,11
the guarantee fee should be related to the market price of
a long-term government security or bond. Since the guar-
antee cover constitutes an allocation of government re-
sources to the project, the premium or fee for that cover
should be based on the opportunity cost of the allocated
resource. There is also a great advantage in calibrating
the guarantee fee according to the relative risks in infra-
structure projects. In this regard, government should iden-
tify all the possible risks that can affect the project, rank
them according to their weight and probability of occur-
rence, and make a judgment on what specific risks the
government is willing to cover. Thus, having a risk-adjusted
and market-based guarantee fee will enable government
to provide adequate guarantee cover and create the proper
incentives for private demand for that cover.
An approach to contingent liability risk
management
A contingent liability is one whose value is uniquely
dependent on states of nature that will occur in the fu-
ture. The timing of the occurrence of these states is un-
known. Because the government exercises a limited
amount of control over many activities, it is not aware of
how much it can lose when events trigger payment or
service obligations.
Using the present value approach to estimate con-
tingent liabilities, one can take the present value of total
future payments to be made within the next ten years to all
BOT operators with known take-or-pay contracts, and then
compute government's total exposure as, say, a range of
one-to-three percent of this value.
The estimated amount of contingent liabilities is only
indicative and clearly a more refined estimation is needed.
The approach is likewise inadequate since the present value
approach does not take into account the following:
__________
9Llanto and Soriano (1998).
10See Llanto et al. (2000).
11There has been no history of guarantee calls which is, in a way,
fortunate for the economy. Option pricing techniques seem relevant for




] estimates of past and future expected market
demand when estimating exposure to market risk;
] while take-or-pay contracts insure private opera-
tors against market risk, the government has a larger
exposure to contractual buyouts and termination pay-
ments which are triggered by force majeure and other
events; and
] the exposure to risks may actually be higher than
the 1 to 3 percent range.
The contingent liabilities should be carefully moni-
tored and managed in order to minimize the costs of ac-
tual calls on the government. An appropriate contingent
liabilities management framework could therefore inform
government’s decision on providing guarantees, expec-
tation of guarantee calls in the future, and the setting of
reserves for the contingent event.
The underlying rule is to identify first, the different
types of risks and second, the best way to improve their
management, whether by insuring, transferring, mitigat-
ing or retaining the risk. This approach, when adapted to
the public sector, takes into account the government’s
budgetary processes, the legal environment and the type
of risks being evaluated. The approach has six steps, de-
scribed as follows:12
Identifying risk exposure and sharing risks Identifying risk exposure and sharing risks
with the private sector with the private sector
To determine the government’s risk exposure, there
is a need to first identify all types of risks in a given infra-
structure project. Then, the cost and loss implications of
the identified risks have to be assessed. The government
should then evaluate which party (public or private) has
the best access to the information needed to most accu-
rately assess the underlying risks of the project. The spe-
cific risk should be assigned to the party that has the best
information, and the ability to monitor, control and service
the risks.13 In the case of market risks, it is the private
investor that is more capable of monitoring, controlling
and servicing the risk while the government is the appro-
priate party to assume right-of-way, political, and other fun-
damental risks.
Quantifying risk exposure and budgeting for Quantifying risk exposure and budgeting for
expected costs expected costs
It is not feasible to account for every source of risk
in projects and the pragmatic approach is thus to identify
risks and rank them in order of highest probability of oc-
currence. Quantification of risk exposure can be done
through valuation techniques, depending on the availability
of data, e.g., data on the performance of a project or pro-
gram, the quality of data and others.14
With a quantification of its risk exposure, the gov-
ernment can start budgeting for expected costs. Infor-
mation on expected costs will be based on the
government’s review of the project situation, including
performance of the project proponent, which can be done
on annual basis during the cooperation or guarantee agree-
ment period.
Budgeting for the expected costs will have as a main
impediment the simple cash-based budgeting system of
the government.15 Because guarantees translate into ac-
tual costs only when a guarantee call is made, they re-
main as contingent liabilities. The government’s cash-
budget accounting system does not normally carry this
as an expenditure item and so, contingent liabilities do
not appear in the government’s accounts. No funds are
therefore budgeted to cover them.
In this regard, the NEDA-ICC has recognized the need
to include in the financial analysis of BOT projects the ac-
counting of contingent liabilities16 so that it can have bench-
marks on the number of BOT projects or the magnitude of
contingent liabilities that may be programmed in a given
__________
12This draws on Lewis and Mody (1998).
13Ibid.
14Lewis and Mody (1998) list several techniques, e.g., those used to
value options in financial markets. A technique called stochastic simula-
tion was used to quantify net expected loss in their study of Colombian
contingent liabilities.
15Originally pointed out by Mody and Patro (1996).
16Draft highlights of the Investment Coordination Committee Work-





year. The ICC has thus proposed that the national govern-
ment should integrate contingent liabilities accounting into
its budgeting and financial programming framework and
process. To accomplish this, the government should first
develop a database of national government exposure to
contingent liabilities which can be based on a review of all
contractual provisions that have contingent liability impli-
cations.17
Providing reserves against unexpected losses Providing reserves against unexpected losses
In addition to budgeting for expected costs, the
government should also make reserves against unex-
pected losses. The reserve policy depends partly on how
often the government wants to approach the legislature
for funds. If government has a good sense of the ex-
pected and unexpected losses, then frequent funding
requests may be avoided. The advantage of having a re-
serve fund is that the liquidity, value and credibility of the
guarantee cover is enhanced, making it a potent tool to
influence private sector investment decisions. Investing
the reserve assets will maximize the value of the reserve
fund thereby creating a hedge for future guarantee calls.18
Government’s tolerance for risk bearing Government’s tolerance for risk bearing
The main idea behind government’s tolerance for
risk bearing is to find out just how much losses arising
from guarantee calls the government can absorb in a given
time period. Based on an annual review of the guarantee
cover given and the implied contingent liabilities, the per-
formance of the project and the project proponents, and
the macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions, the
government should be able to develop a pattern of prob-
able defaults. There are two general approaches for this,
namely:19 (a) establish the probability of default in each
specific project; or (b) determine the probability of default
of the government’s portfolio of guarantee cover. The lat-
ter is a portfolio value-at-risk approach that takes into ac-
count portfolio diversification. Having an understanding of
the pattern of probable defaults, the government can then
determine how much guarantee calls it can absorb, given
other competing demands for scarce resources.
Risk mitigation and control mechanisms Risk mitigation and control mechanisms
A vital component of a risk management framework
is the risk mitigation and control mechanism. This is the
first barrier of defense of the government against moral
hazard problems that are ever present in guarantee ar-
rangement. One way to develop this is to require the guar-
anteed party to hold a certain amount of capital or collat-
eral as a first-loss protection barrier.20 Government can
also place restrictions on the use of the reserves set aside
for future guarantee calls to assure itself that funds will be
available for unexpected costs. Another way of doing it is
to have proper pricing of guarantee fees to create the proper
incentives for parties requiring them. Finally, risk-sharing
between the government and private proponents is an ef-
fective firewall against moral hazard and incentives prob-
lems in infrastructure projects.
System for monitoring and evaluating System for monitoring and evaluating
government’s risk exposure government’s risk exposure
A fundamental aspect of accounting for and monitor-
ing exposure is the establishment of a standard reporting
format for contingent liabilities. This will be important in
monitoring exposure and other implications of the contrac-
tual arrangements. Conditions that may trigger payment
obligations on the part of government, the performance of
sponsoring agencies and other support agencies in limit-
ing exposure, risk, and actual payments, should be moni-
tored. Contingent liabilities should also be regularly reported
to the public or at least to Congress.
Conclusion and recommendations
Government guarantees can be effective tools to
encourage private sector participation in infrastructure de-
velopment. The past experience with comprehensive guar-
antees, however, shows that the government now faces a
substantial amount of contingent liabilities. Actual guaran-
__________
17The case study of the contingent liabilities in the power sector is an
example of this important exercise. See Llanto et al. (2000).
18Lewis and Mody (1998) from which most of the ideas are taken,
provide an extended discussion of the problem of provisioning for expected
and unexpected costs and creating a reserve fund.
19Ibid.




tee calls convert these liabilities into real costs which will
have serious fiscal implications for government. The gov-
ernment should thus review the guarantee contracts, par-
ticularly those with IPPs to find ways to mitigate its risk
exposure and payment for guarantee claims.
In this light, it is important to regularly report to Con-
gress the extent of guarantees provided by the govern-
ment and the associated contingent liabilities. Likewise,
disclosure of contracts and guarantee agreements should
be part of the regular information-sharing with the public
and Congress.
This Policy Notes shows how critical it is for govern-
ment to have an appropriate framework for the grant of
guarantee cover, a credible risk and contingent liability
management approach.
In conclusion, the following recommendations are
hereby presented:
] The government should develop a framework for
providing guarantee cover to infrastructure projects, the
elements of which are:
l treatment of guarantee cover as a scarce re-
source that should be efficiently allocated,
l pricing of a guarantee according to market con-
ditions and relative risks,
l risk-sharing between project proponent and gov-
ernment,
l core guarantees for selected risks and applicable
across sectors and projects,
l exit strategy or fall-away clause in guarantee con-
tracts'
l guarantee fee based on the duration of coopera-
tion between government and investors, and
l annual review of guarantee fee based on project
performance and business and economic condi-
tions.
] The government should develop a contingent li-
ability risk management approach whose elements in-
clude:
l identification of the government’s risk exposures
by reviewing existing contracts and trigger events,
l measurement or quantification of expected and
unexpected exposures,
l provisioning for expected costs in the budgetary
process,
l assessment of government’s tolerance for bear-
ing risk,
l use of government’s risk tolerance as a basis
for establishing policies and procedures for
structuring reserves against unexpected losses,
l implementation of risk mitigation and control
mechanisms to prevent unintended losses on
those risks, and
l establishment of systems to continually monitor
and reassess the government’s risk exposure
over time.  4 4
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